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THE MACROECONOMIC ROLE OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 1
1 Introduction
While there is growing evidence on the importance of productivity dispersion across firms,2, there is
little modelling of policy in the presence of such dispersion. In particular, unemployment compen-
sation policy, which is a key macroeconomic and labor market policy tool, has, generally, not been
linked with such productivity diﬀerences. Similarly, there has been no discussion of the possible
response of unemployment compensation policy to technological change. This paper shows how
such policy can increase output by enhancing the assignment of workers to jobs in the face of firm
productivity dispersion and technological change. It shows that in order to do so policy needs to
be a function of the properties of the firms productivity distribution. The paper undertakes an
empirically-grounded, normative analysis of this issue.
More specifically, the analysis formulates policy as a function of two key properties of the
productivity distribution: its variance, which quantifies the extent of dispersion, and its skew-
ness, which quantifies its highly uneven nature. Noting that productivity and wage distributions
are related and that wage dispersion and wage inequality are high on the research agenda,3 the
analysis bears upon the wage distribution as well. The paper shows how optimal unemployment
compensation policy is aﬀected by wages and aﬀects them in turn.
The standard motivation for unemployment compensation is usually the provision of a tool
for consumption smoothing over periods of employment and unemployment. Indeed, most of the
literature has been concerned with trade-oﬀs involving consumption smoothing and moral hazard.
While it has been recognized that even when agents are risk-neutral unemployment compensation
1We are grateful to seminar participants at Tel Aviv University, Tilburg, Munich, Haifa, Ben Gurion, and Zurich
for helpful comments, and to the Armand Hammer Fund for financial support. Any errors are our own.
2As found, for example, by Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999), Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996), and
Hatiwanger, Lane and Speltzer (1999, 2006). See the discussion in Section 5 below.
3Particularly with a growing sense of labor market polarization, see, for example, Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006).
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can be used to induce them to search more intensively, thereby improving the quality of matches,
not much attention has been devoted to the macroeconomic role of unemployment compensation
policy.4
The paper derives an optimal time path for unemployment compensation policy. The in-
tuition for this path may be summarized as follows. Consider a frictional environment where the
assignment of unemployed workers to jobs with heterogenous productivity is uncoordinated and
governed by a random matching process. All firms pay the reservation wage. At the beginning
of their unemployment spell agents are relatively more choosy and tend to await better job oﬀers.
Later on, the reservation wage drops and agents are willing to take less attractive job oﬀers. Het-
erogenous firms respond by introducing endogenous market segmentation. In equilibrium, more
productive firms oﬀer higher wages, anticipating a tighter ‘sub-market’, namely lower vacancy risk.
Less productive firms oﬀer lower wages and face higher vacancy risk as only long-term unemployed
workers will accept the oﬀer. A declining unemployment compensation profile results in voluntary
unemployment by the short term unemployed but features improved matching, as it shifts the labor
force towards the more productive firms. A random matching environment thus turns assortative
via compensation policy. The mechanism described implies that heterogenous firms respond to the
reservation wage time-profile induced by unemployment compensation policy. Wage setting takes
this reservation profile into account so as to attract workers, while unemployment compensation
policy takes wage setting into account to produce output gains. Optimal unemployment compen-
sation policy is then shown to crucially depend on the nature of the productivity distribution, in
particular on its variance and skewness. Note, too, that inducing agents to search more intensively
is essentially a Pigouvian motive, i.e. internalizing positive matching externalities.
The paper makes two main contributions: first, it shows how the properties of the produc-
tivity distribution should aﬀect unemployment compensation policy, providing a link between two
4There is some work on productivity growth and policy [see for example Mortensen and Pissarides (1998)] and
on the macroeconomic eﬀects of unemployment compensation [see for example Pissarides (1998)] but these lines of
research typically do not relate to the properties of the productivity distribution.
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key issues that were unrelated. This link is mediated by the wage posting policies of firms that take
both productivity and policy into account. A key point made is that the degree of productivity
heterogeneity, in terms of skewness and variance, matters for the adoption of a flat unemploy-
ment compensation time profile or a declining path. Second, it demonstrates the assortative or
assignment role of optimal unemployment compensation policy. It does so within a macroeconomic
framework that is shown to be empirically relevant.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 discusses optimal
unemployment compensation policy in the face of firm productivity dispersion and demonstrates
the results with an illustrative numerical solution. Section 4 shows how optimal policy is aﬀected
by skill-biased technological change. Section 5 discusses the empirical relevance of key elements of
the model, while Section 6 presents the relation of the paper with the relevant literature. Section
7 concludes. Technical matters are relegated to appendices. In what follows we shall use the terms
assortative matching, worker assignment, and worker sorting interchangeably.
2 The model
In what follows we describe the general set up (2.1) and then look at two alternative time paths
for unemployment compensation policy: constant (2.2) and declining (2.3).
2.1 The General Set-Up
There is a continuum of workers whose measure is given by L > 0, and a continuum of firms whose
measure is given by M > L. . Firms diﬀer in the technology they possess. Each firm can post
a vacancy, incurring no costs, w.l.o.g. Once the vacancy is filled, the job produces x units of the
single perishable consumption good, which price in normalized to unity. Production terminates
with an exogenous Poisson parameter, s > 0. Otherwise the vacancy produces nothing.
The technological parameter, x, is assumed to be distributed according to the cumulative
distribution function:
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G(·) ∼ [x, x]
with strictly positive densities.
Workers are ex-ante identical in all respects and are assumed to be risk neutral. Let us
note that this homogeneity assumption renders the model more tractable but is not crucial for the
analysis. If workers were heterogenous, what would be needed is that their degree of heterogeneity
be lower than the extent of technological dispersion. Firms are assumed to be expected-profit
maximizers. To close the general equilibrium model we assume that workers possess an equal stake
in each of the firms.
In every period (time is assumed to be discrete) firms post wage rates. Then, unemployed
workers are randomly assigned to vacancies. Without loss of generality we assume that each active
firm posts a single vacancy. Upon receiving a job oﬀer, the worker decides whether to accept or
reject the oﬀer. This can be termed ‘voluntary unemployment’. We assume that firms do not
oﬀer a menu of wages. This assumption is due to the idea that the individual’s unemployment
spell is unobserved by firms, so firms cannot condition the oﬀered wage rate on the length of
unemployment experienced by the individual applicant. Another reason is the prevalence of anti-
discrimination laws that do now allow a firm to oﬀer diﬀerent wages for equally productive workers,
due to diﬀerences in unemployment duration.
We assume that search intensity is fixed and normalized to one application per period. We
further assume that all unassigned individuals are eligible for unemployment compensation, and
that unemployment compensation is financed by neutral lump-sum taxes levied on all individuals.
We now turn to analyze the optimal behavior of the agents in steady-state equilibrium
under diﬀerent unemployment compensation time paths.
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2.2 A Constant Compensation Profile
Consider first an unemployment compensation scheme with a constant time profile. The sole
purpose of this discussion is to serve as a benchmark for the analysis which follows. Note that
throughout we assume that agents search only when unemployed.
Following Diamond’s (1971) seminal contribution, by the homogeneity of workers, and since
on-the-job-search is ruled out and firms are committed to the wages posted prior to the arrival of
the job applicants, the wage distribution collapses to a singleton. Denote the equilibrium wage
rate, which coincides with the uniform reservation wage, by w. It therefore follows that:5
w = a+ h (1)
where a and h ≤ x denote the constant unemployment compensation and the imputed value of
leisure, respectively.
The typical worker’s optimal acceptance rule is trivial, namely accept the first oﬀer received.
Turning next to firms, it is easy to observe that firms, provided that they decide to operate, will
choose to oﬀer the uniform wage rate, w. This emerges from the fact that workers are assumed not
to search on the job. Thus, applicants accept any job oﬀer above the reservation instantaneously,
and firms choose to oﬀer precisely the reservation wage. Cutting this wage even slightly will increase
vacancy risk to infinity, making profits drop to zero. Oﬀering above it does not bring any gain, as
it does not aﬀect the vacancy risk because of the reservation strategy.
Firms diﬀer in their productivity and correspondingly need to take a strategic decision,
whether to enter the market or remain idle. Given w, the equilibrium wage rate, all firms possessing
a technology x ≥ w will participate, for all expect the arrival of applicants with strictly positive
probability.
5We assume that unemployment compensation is financed by lump-sum taxation, and so the reservation wage rate
only depends on the compensation level a and not on the tax rate, which thus has no distorting eﬀect on workers’
acceptance decisions.
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Denote by U and V , the measure of unemployed workers and unfilled vacancies in steady
state equilibrium, respectively. Let F denote the steady state measure of active firms, which is also
the number of jobs, filled or vacant, in the economy. In equilibrium the following conditions hold
true, in addition to the wage determination condition given by equation (1) above:
L− U = F − V (2)
M (1−G(w)) = F (3)
m(U, V ) = s (F − V ) (4)
The interpretation of the equations above is straightforward. Equation (2) defines the
equilibrium condition according to which the measure of matched workers on the left-hand side
is equal to the measure of filled vacancies on the right-hand side. Equation (3) defines the entry
condition, given that the prevailing wage rate is w. Equation (4) states the familiar worker flow
condition (the Beveridge curve). We assume a standard constant-returns to scale matching function,
wherem(U, V ) denotes the number of successful matches,m(U, V ) is strictly increasing with respect
to its two arguments and m (U, V ) < min (U, V ) . On the left-hand side we have, therefore, the flow
into the pool of filled vacancies (successful matches). The right-hand side gives the flow out of the
pool of filled vacancies.
With equations (1)-(4) we can solve for the equilibrium recursively, for any level of the
constant level of unemployment compensation a. First we substitute for w (from (1)) into (3) and
obtain an explicit solution for F . We then obtain a system of two equations ((2) and (4)) solved
for two unknowns, U and V .6
6Note that the solution is unique, as equation (2) is upward sloping in U-V space, whereas equation (4) is downward
sloping, so that there exists a single crossing of the two curves.
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By relaxing the fixed arrival rate paradigm of conventional wage-posting search equilib-
rium models, we obtain the inherent trade-oﬀ between sorting and employment using an extremely
simple framework. To see this, let welfare be measured by per-capita utility, that is per-capita con-
sumption plus the value imputed to per-capita leisure. By lowering a, the constant unemployment
compensation , the wage rate, w, is lowered, thereby reducing unemployment. On the other hand,
the fall in w, brings in less productive firms (the lower tail of the productivity distribution) that
previously failed to break even.
More formally, given the welfare measure defined above, the maximization problem solved
by the social planner is given by:
max
a,τ
{(L− U)E[x | x > w] + Uh} (5)
s.t. equations (1)-(4), and the budget constraint, assuming no revenue needs for the government,
given by:
Ua− Lτ = 0 (6)
where, E[·] denotes the expectation operator, and τ denotes the uniform lump-sum tax.7
Using equation (3), the maximization may be re-formulated as a function of F :
max
F
{(F − V )
µ
E[x | x > G−1(1− F
M
)]− h
¶
+ Lh} (7)
subject to equations (2)-(4) and (6). Note that G−1 is well defined since by assumption densities
are strictly positive. Equations (5) and (7) indicate that we can solve for the optimum by setting
the number of posted vacancies F optimally, and implement it via setting the wage w through the
determination of unemployment compensation a. The lump sum tax,τ , is then set to satisfy the
budget constraint in (6)
7Note that in the objective in (5) the fiscal instruments a and τ do not appear explicitly. This derives from the
fact that individuals are assumed to be risk-neutral and the budget constraint is balanced.
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By fully diﬀerentiating equation (2) and (4) with respect to F , it follows that dVdF < 1,
thus the term F − V is rising with respect to F. At the same time the second term (E[x | x >
G−1(1− FM )]) decreases, since firms possessing technologies of lower productivity enter the market,
thereby reducing expected productivity. The optimal F balances these two opposing eﬀects, namely
employment versus enhanced matching. Note that without unemployment compensation (i.e.,
a = 0) wages are determined by the imputed value of leisure (h) and are, therefore, independent
of the productivity distribution. Thus, unemployment compensation plays a corrective role by
internalizing externalities associated with the matching frictions in the labor market.
2.3 A Declining Time Path
We now allow for a declining unemployment compensation profile. We confine attention to a two-
tiered regime, in which agents are eligible for a short period of regular unemployment compensation,
followed by an indefinite period of reduced compensation, which we refer to as income support.
Let z denote the unemployment compensation and let the level of income support be denoted by a
(z > a). We assume that z is paid during the first two periods of unemployment and that all agents
who exhaust their eligibility for unemployment compensation are henceforth indefinitely eligible
for income support. Later on, we relax the two period assumption. Unemployment compensation
eligibility is assumed to be independent of work history, for simplicity.
First, consider the intuition. A declining profile implies a non-degenerate wage distribution,
while, as we saw, with a constant profile, there exists a unique wage rate in equilibrium. This key
feature derives from the wage-posting setting and the fact the agents search only when unemployed.
While agents are ex-ante identical in all respects, the declining profile implies that short-term
unemployed agents, faced with a non-degenerate distribution of wage oﬀers, will have a higher
reservation wage rate than long-term unemployed agents who have already exhausted their eligibility
for unemployment compensation. The declining unemployment compensation profile yields ex-post
heterogeneity among ex-ante identical agents. For a suﬃciently dispersed set of technologies, a
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two-wage equilibrium exists. Voluntary unemployment by short-term unemployed agents induces
firms possessing more productive technologies to oﬀer higher wages, thereby reducing their vacancy
risk. Assuming two levels of unemployment compensation and two periods when the first level is
in place, we can restrict attention to a two-wage equilibrium.
We turn now to a formal presentation of the model and the optimal policy.
Unemployed Workers Value Function. We start with the value functions for a typical agent
in the economy. There are four states to consider: employment, two states of short-term unem-
ployment for each period of unemployment compensation eligibility, and long term unemployment
(income support recipients). We start with the three unemployment states, denoting by H1,H2,
H, the continuation value functions for short-term unemployed agents during the first and second
period of the unemployment spell, respectively, and income support recipients. In steady-state
equilibrium the following asset-value conditions hold:
H1 = z + h+ β[nmax(J,H2) + nmax(J,H2) + (1− n− n)H2] (8)
H2 = z + h+ β[nmax(J,H) + nmax(J,H) + (1− n− n)H] (9)
H = a+ h+ β[nmax(J,H) + nmax(J,H) + (1− n− n)H] (10)
where J, J denote the high and low wage jobs continuation values, respectively, n, n denote re-
employment chances in firms oﬀering high and low wage rates, respectively, and β ∈ (0, 1) denotes
the discount factor. In addition to the value of leisure h, short-term unemployed get unemployment
compensation z and long-term unemployed get income support a. In the following period they move
either to a job or to the next stage of unemployment.8
8Note that the assignment of unemployed individuals to unfilled vacancies is assumed to occur at the end of each
period. Thus, although there are three stages of unemployment, there will be only two reservation wages, and hence
two wage rates, in equilibrium.
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Employment Value Functions. The steady state value functions for the two types of jobs,
those with high wage rate and low wage rate, respectively, are given by J and J :
J = w + β[(1− s)J + sH1] (11)
J = w + β[(1− s)J + sH1] (12)
Workers get the relevant wage in each job and face the exogenous separation probability s.
Wages. By virtue of wage posting and the assumption that individuals search only while
unemployed, in equilibrium firms oﬀer such wages so as to satisfy the following reservation asset
values:
J = H2 (13)
J = H (14)
It is easy to verify that the reservation wage property is satisfied, by observing that J =
H2 > J = H. Thus, short-term unemployed agents will accept only high wage oﬀers during their
first period of unemployment compensation eligibility. All other unemployed agents will accept any
oﬀer.
Manipulating equations (8)-(14) yields the following two conditions which determine the
equilibrium wage oﬀers as a function of the policy parameters (z and a), the re-employment prob-
abilities (n, n), the discount factor (β) and the separation rate (s):9
z − a = w − w
1− β(1− s) (15)
9See appendix A for the full derivation.
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w = (z − a)[(1− β) + βn− β2s(1− n)] + h+ a (16)
Matching. The re-employment probabilities in firms oﬀering the high and low wage rate,
respectively, are given by:
n =
m(U,V )
U
V
V
(17)
n =
m(U,V )
U
V
V
(18)
where V and V denote the measures of unfilled vacancies posted by firms oﬀering the high wage rate
and low wage rate, respectively, V = V + V denotes the aggregate measure of unfilled vacancies
and U denotes the measure of aggregate unemployment.
Steady State Flow Equations. The standard steady state flow conditions are given by:
U2 = (1− n)U1 (19)
(U − U1 − U2)(n+ n) = (1− n− n)U2 (20)
m(U, V )
V
V
= s
¡
F − V
¢
(21)
m(U, V )
V
V
(U − U1)
U
= s
¡
F − F − V
¢
(22)
where , Uj , j = 1, 2 denotes the measure of unemployed agents during the jth period of unemploy-
ment compensation eligibility and F denotes the measure of vacancies posted by firms oﬀering the
high wage rate in equilibrium.10
10Note that the last term on the left-hand-side of (22) captures the voluntary unemployment of individuals during
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Steady State Equilibrium. To complete the characterization of steady state equilibrium we
introduce the following conditions and interpret them:
L− U = F − V − V (23)
F =M (1−G(w)) (24)
m(U, V )
V
(bx− w) = m(U, V )
V
(U − U1)
U
(bx− w) (25)
F =M (1−G(bx)) (26)
Equation (23) is the condition according to which the measure of filled vacancies is equal to
the measure of employed agents. Equation (24) is a consistency condition, which requires that the
total measure of active firms (hence posted vacancies) should be equal to the fraction of the firms
possessing a technology above the lower bound wage rate times the measure of potential firms.
Equation (25) determines the wage distribution by defining a cutoﬀ technology, bx, above which all
firms maximize expected profits by oﬀering the high wage rate, and below which all firms maximize
expected profits by oﬀering the low wage rate. To see this, note that the probability of filling a
high-wage vacancy, given by m(U,V )/V , is higher than that of filling a low-wage vacancy, given
correspondingly by m(U, V )/V · [(U − U1)/U ], by virtue of the voluntary unemployment by short-
term unemployed. Thus, it follows from (25) that firms with productivity exceeding the threshold
obtain higher expected profits by posting a high-wage vacancy, whereas firms with productivity
below the threshold, prefer to post a low wage vacancy. Equation (26) is a consistency condition
similar to (24) with regard to the firms oﬀering the high wage rate in equilibrium.
the first period of unemployment. These individulas (of measure U1), whose reservation wage is high, reject low-wage
job oﬀers. Thus, the number of successful matches is multiplied by an additional term, U−U1U < 1, to obtain the flow
of newly formed low-wage jobs.
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Optimality Problem. The optimality problem may be written as follows:
max
a,z,τ
{(F − F − V )E[x | w ≤ x ≤ bx] (27)
+ (F − V )E[x | x > bx]
+ Uh}
subject to the above 12 equations [equations (15) — (26)] and the budget constraint, given by:
(U1 + U2)z + (U − U1 − U2)a− Lτ = 0 (28)
Equilibrium is defined by this system of equations, where a, z and τ are solved according
to (27).
It can be shown that the above formulation, which focuses on choosing the levels of unem-
ployment compensation and income support, can be mapped into the following equivalent structure,
focusing on the allocation of production:
max
x
=
,?x
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
M
xZ
x
=
xdG(x)− V
?xZ
x
=
xdG(x)
G(bx)−G(x
=
)
− V
xZ
?x
xdG(x)
1−G(bx) + Uh
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(29)
subject to equations (21), (22),(23), (26) and:
U1 = s (L− U) . (30)
F =M
³
1−G(x
=
)
´
(31)
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In other words, the policymaker chooses x
=
, the threshold productivity level above which
firms enter the labor market, and bx, the productivity level above which firms oﬀer the high wage
rate in equilibrium. The optimal allocation can be implemented by appropriate wage rates, w and
w (employing equations (24) and (25)) through the choice of the two unemployment compensation
policy instruments a and z (employing equations (15) and (16)).11 The lump-sum tax, τ , is then set
to satisfy the budget constraint in (28). Note that the firm productivity distribution G(x) enters
into the objective function (29) and into the constraints (26) and (31).
A declining unemployment compensation schedule creates enhanced sorting by inducing
‘voluntary’ unemployment by individuals at the initial phase of their unemployment spell in addition
to that attained by a flat schedule via the crowding out of low-productivity firms from the labor
market. Thus, it serves to “fine tune” the matching process.
3 Optimal Unemployment Compensation Policy and the Produc-
tivity Distribution
The question we would like to address is a normative one, namely under what circumstances is a
declining unemployment compensation profile optimal. Moreover, we want to link this policy with
the properties of the firm productivity distribution. Intuitively it seems that the answer should
relate to the extent to which the set of technologies is dispersed. As the above problem has no closed
form solution, it needs to be addressed by numerical methods. We opt for the simplest possible
set-up, i.e., a discrete distribution of technologies, which comprises two elements in its support.
We find that it is a rich enough formulation to demonstrate the linkages between the moments
of the productivity distribution and optimal unemployment compensation policy. Hence we are
able to undertake a comparative statics analysis, which shows policy responses to changes in the
characteristics of the productivity distribution. First, we characterize the types of worker sorting
11The flat UI profile is obtained as a special case of the allocation problem in (29) when x
=
= ?x. In such a case, a
would be set equal to z, so as to induce w = w.
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which emerge under the diﬀerent unemployment compensation paths analyzed above (3.1). We then
study the relationship between the welfare levels induced by the diﬀerent paths and the properties
of the productivity distribution (3.2). Finally, we examine the case where policy determines the
duration of the first tier of the unemployment compensation path (3.3).
3.1 Firm Technologies, Worker Sorting, and Optimal Unemployment Compen-
sation Paths
Suppose there are two technologies, denoted by x and x, where x > x > h. Denote by 0 < p < 1 the
fraction of firms, which measure is given by M > 0, possessing x. We henceforth restrict attention
to pure-strategy equilibria.
There are three equilibrium configurations to consider. A benchmark case is the one in which
the unemployment compensation profile is constant and the compensation is set suﬃciently low, so
that all firms are active in equilibrium. We refer to this configuration as maximum employment or
no-sorting, interchangeably. A second case, is the one in which the unemployment compensation
time profile is constant, but the compensation is set high enough so as to crowd out the low-
productivity firms. We refer to this configuration as high-sorting. In the third configuration both
technologies are active, but due to a declining unemployment compensation time profile, voluntary
unemployment by short-term unemployed agents yields partial-sorting.
Denote by NHS, NPSand NNS, the steady-sate measures of employed workers in the
high-sorting, partial-sorting and no-sorting configurations, respectively (where N = L− U).
We have already observed that NNS > NHS(see the characterization of equilibrium in
the constant profile unemployment compensation regime). Close inspection of (21)-(23) yields that
NNS > NPS . This condition derives directly from the existence of ‘voluntary’ unemployment in
the partial-sorting configuration.12
12By aggregating (21) and (22) and comparing the expression to (4), it can be seen that for a given measure
of active firms and for any level of unemployment, the market clears with a higher measure of aggregate unfilled
vacancies relative to the constant UI regime.
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However, one cannot relate NHS and NPS without making further assumptions. This
ambiguity derives from the trade-oﬀ between unemployment in the high sorting case, when a lower
measure of firms participates, and ‘voluntary’ unemployment in the partial sorting case, due to
workers’ ex-post heterogeneity emerging from the declining unemployment compensation profile.
Formulating the welfare measures for each one of the three configurations (denoted W, and
maintaining our definition of welfare from the previous section), we obtain the following:
WNS = NNS[px+ (1− p)x− h] + Lh (32)
WPS = NPS [qx+ (1− q)x− h] + Lh (33)
WHS = NHS[x− h] + Lh (34)
where q = (pM−V )
M−V−V and it is easy to show, using (21) and (22), that 1 > q > p.
Equation (32) is the “benchmark” case: a fraction p of workers go to the high technology
firms and 1−p to the low technology ones and NNS is determined solely through random matching.
At the other extreme there is (34) with a constant unemployment compensation profile: here only
the high technology is in operation. The two equations (32) and (34) express the trade-oﬀ between
employment and sorting as NNS > NHS and [x− h] > [px+ (1− p)x− h]. The intermediate case
is that of a declining unemployment compensation profile − equation (33). This policy balances
the two considerations, employment and productivity. In order to increase the degree of sorting in
the market, namely to shift workers away from low-productivity firms to high-productivity ones,
the policymaker sacrifices a rise in unemployment. The optimal policy depends on the properties
of the productivity distribution, as illustrated below.
It is easy to verify the existence of policy instruments that implement the social optimum.
For the no sorting case set x ≥ a and for the high sorting case set x ≥ a ≥x . For the par-
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tial sorting configuration, see appendix B. Note that if taxation were distortionary,13 then when
NPS > NHS the case for a declining unemployment compensation profile is reinforced. This is so
because expenditures on unemployment compensation are lower under the PS regime due to lower
unemployment.
3.2 Unemployment Compensation Policy and the Variance and Skewness of the
Productivity Distribution
We now study the relationship between the optimal unemployment compensation time path, wel-
fare, and the productivity distribution. To do so we fix the average productivity in the economy and
denote it by μ, where μ = px+ (1− p)x > h. Consider a mean-preserving spread 4 ≥ 0 whereby
x = μ+4 and x = μ− p41−p , with x ≥ h. Then the moments of this productivity distribution are
given by:14
mean μ
standard deviation σ
q
p
1−p4
skewness (1− 2p)
p
(1− p)p
Reformulation of equations (32) - (34) yields the following:
WNS = NNS[μ− h] + Lh (35)
WPS = NPS [μ− h] +NPS q − p
1− p 4+Lh (36)
WHS = NHS [μ− h] +NHS 4+Lh (37)
13Recall that we have assumed throughout that benefits are financed by lump-sum taxation.
14Note that when p = 0.5 then σ = 4 and the skewness is zero; when 0.5 < p < 1, the skewness is negative, and
when 0 < p < 0.5 the skewness is positive.
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We turn now to characterize the general properties of optimal policy (in sub-section 3.2.1)
and then present a numerical simulation that provides further illustration of this policy (in sub-
section 3.2.2).
3.2.1 General Properties
The following proposition establishes some general properties of optimal unemployment compensa-
tion policy. It refers to the following illustrative figure, where we depict each of the three configu-
rations in welfare-productivity spread space (W −4).15 Note that social optimum is given by the
welfare frontier (the upper envelope of the figure).
15The mean and the skewness in the figure are fixed. Due to the fact that the skewness depends on the parameter p
only, shifts in the (mean preserving) spread parameter 4 measure shifts in the standard deviation of the productivity
distribution.
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Figure 1: Optimality and Productivity Variance (spread)
Proposition 1 Holding fixed the mean (μ) and the skewness (p), there exist thresholds 41and 42
where 0 < 41 ≤ 42 ≤ 1−pp [μ− h], such that: for all 0 < 4 ≤ 41 social welfare is maximized by
the no sorting configuration, for all 41 ≤ 4 ≤ 42social welfare is maximized by the partial sorting
configuration, and for all 42 ≤ 4 ≤ 1−pp [μ− h] social welfare is maximized by the high sorting
configuration.
The proof is given in Appendix B.
While the discrete two-technology case is stylized, it provides us with some clear insights
regarding the forces at play. When the set of technologies is almost degenerate, i.e., the spread 4
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converges to zero, there is little to gain from introducing ‘voluntary’ unemployment and shifting
the pool of workers away from low-productivity firms towards high-productivity ones. In this case
unemployment compensation is redundant. When, however, technologies are suﬃciently dispersed,
the partial sorting configuration is preferred to the no-sorting one. In graphical terms, the partial
sorting solution dominates in the interval41−42. This interval is well-defined only when there is a
substantial diﬀerence between the intercepts of the HS and PS schedules (on the vertical axis). This
implies a suﬃcient degree of right-skewness of the productivity distribution. When dispersion is very
large, it is desirable to increase unemployment by eliminating employment at low-productivity firms
altogether and obtaining high (full) sorting. For intermediate values of the technological spread,
social welfare is maximized by the partial sorting configuration, hence a declining unemployment
compensation profile is optimal.16 In the two other cases, a constant profile, either no sorting or
high-sorting, suﬃces.
3.2.2 Numerical Solution
We turn now to a numerical solution of the model. We shall assume a standard constant-returns-
to-scale Cobb-Douglas matching function of the form m(U,V ) = γUαV 1−α, where 0 < α, γ < 1. In
Figure 2 we plot four diﬀerent curves in skewness (skew) — s.d. (σ) space.17
16This discrete example extends to continuous cases with suﬃcient skewness. In cases that are not skewed (or not
suﬃciently skewed), such as the uniform distribution, the constant profile dominates.
17The figure is based on the numerical solution using the following parametric assumptions: M = 100, L = 70, s =
0.01, h = 0, μ = 10, α = 0.5 and γ = 0.1.
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Figure 2: Skewness and Variance Relationships
The four curves depict the following:
The curve labeled F represents a feasibility constraint defined by the non-negativity of the
lower-bound technology, x. The set of feasible points lies above the curve.
Along the N-H curve the welfare attained by a no-sorting equilibrium configuration is equal
to the welfare attained by the high-sorting configuration, where the lower-bound technology is
crowded out of the market. Note that as the welfare in the no-sorting configuration case depends on
the mean productivity of the distribution of technologies, and is completely insensitive to the other
two moments, the curve N-H is essentially an indiﬀerence curve for the high-sorting configuration
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along which the welfare attained by the high-sorting configuration is constant. The positive slope
of the curve is due to the fact that the gains from sorting increase with respect to the standard
deviation of the distribution of technologies and decrease with respect to its skewness. A larger
value of skewness implies that a higher weight is shifted to the lower bound technology which is
crowded out in the high-sorting configuration, which, in turn, implies a higher unemployment rate.
Higher dispersion, captured by a higher value of the standard deviation, implies that the upper
bound technology is farther away from mean productivity, which implies larger gains from sorting.
As we move either downwards (decreasing skewness) or rightwards (increasing the s.d.) the welfare
obtained by the high-sorting configuration rises. Thus, for any point which lies below the N-H
curve, the high-sorting configuration dominates the no-sorting one and vice-versa.
The N-P curve represents points for which the welfare attained by the partial-sorting con-
figuration is equal to the welfare attained by the no-sorting one. The positive slope of the curve
derives from the same reasons given for the N-H curve. Similarly, any point lying above the curve
implies that the no-sorting configuration dominates the partial-sorting one and vice-versa.
Along the P-H curve lie points for which the partial-sorting and the high-sorting configu-
rations attain the same level of utility. The positive slope derives from the fact that the gain from
sorting (shifting from partial-sorting to high-sorting) is increasing with respect to the standard de-
viation and is decreasing with respect to the skewness. It follows that for any point above the P-H
curve, the partial-sorting configuration dominates the high-sorting configuration and vice versa.
Figure 3 depicts on a magnified scale the points in the neighborhood of the point T.P.
in Figure 2, where all three curves (N-P, N-H and P-H) intersect.
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Figure 3: Optimal Unemployment Compensation Regions
Note that by construction, at the point T.P. all three diﬀerent configurations yield the same level
of utility. The solid parts of the curves define a fork-shape borderline which divides up the space
into three regions, according to the dominating equilibrium configuration. For any point which lies
above the upper envelope of the N-P and the N-H curves, the no-sorting configuration is socially
desirable. By the same reasoning for any point which lies below the lower envelope of the P-H and
the N-H curves, the high-sorting configuration is socially desirable. In the remaining region, the
partial sorting is the socially desirable configuration
A number of conclusions emerge.
(i) For a wide range of parameters, the partial sorting equilibrium configuration constitutes
the social optimum, implying a declining unemployment compensation time path.
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(ii) For this partial sorting to prevail, skewness has to be suﬃciently large, exceeding the
skewness associated with the T.P. intersection point. As already demonstrated in Figure 1, for
a given skewness of such magnitude, partial sorting dominates the other two configurations for
intermediate levels of dispersion (standard deviation).
(iii) Similarly, for intermediate levels of skewness, partial sorting dominates when dispersion
is large enough, exceeding the standard deviation associated with the T.P. intersection point.
To see the rationale behind these results, note that when skewness is suﬃciently small,
the costs associated with crowding out the low-productivity firms are relatively small. In such
a case, the high-sorting configuration prevails, as it attains enhanced matching in exchange for
a moderate loss in employment. Similarly, when skewness is large enough, the costs associated
with foregoing the low-productivity firms are significant, rendering the no-sorting configuration the
socially desirable equilibrium, as the gains from sorting (partial or high) are outweighed by the
increase in unemployment. In the intermediate range, partial sorting attains the optimal balance
between employment and matching considerations. As productivity dispersion rises, the ranges in
which the high-sorting and the partial sorting configurations prevail expand, at the expense of the
no-sorting configuration. This is due to the increase in the gains from sorting.
3.3 Duration Policy
In the previous sub-sections we have confined attention to two kinds of unemployment compensation
schemes. We compared a flat time profile, where a constant compensation is paid indefinitely, to
a two-tiered scheme, where individuals are eligible for high compensation during a limited period,
and, thereafter, are eligible for reduced compensation indefinitely. In what follows we generalize
our duration analysis. Denoting the duration of the first tier of the unemployment compensation
scheme by t, we now allow for 0 ≤ t ≤∞, while we have thus far considered only the two schemes
t = 0, i.e., the flat profile, and t = 2 , i.e., the declining profile with two periods for the higher
compensation. We retain the structure of the two-tiered unemployment compensation regime, i.e.,
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regular unemployment compensation and income support, and allow the number of periods in the
first tier to be optimally determined by policy. We examine optimal policy, analyzing the forces
that aﬀect optimal duration in the general setup. In an appendix we re-examine the relationship
between optimal duration and the properties of the productivity distribution, in particular its
standard deviation and skewness in the two-technology case.
In order to maintain the simple property of a two-wage equilibrium, but gain more flexibility
with respect to duration policy, we confine attention to the case of myopic agents.18 Thus we assume
that the discount factor is given by β = 0. This simplifying assumption is made in order to focus
the analysis on the essential duration implications. The insights gained carry over to the more
general case (0 ≤ β ≤ 1).19 Myopia implies that along each of the two tiers, the reservation wages,
and hence the equilibrium wages, are constant. Regardless of the length of the first tier of the
unemployment compensation regime, these will be given respectively by:
w = a+ h
w = z + h
18A diﬀerent approach to simplify the wage structure in equilibrium is to assume a two tiered system (like the one
we have) but allow for a stochastic shift between the two phases of the unemployment compensation policy. Under
such a regime, the expected duration of the unemployment compensation phase can be determined optimally, by
changing the switching probability across the two phases.
19When agents are non-myopic, namely, β > 0, individuals’ reservation wages decline over the first phase of the
unemployment benefits schedule. That is, as individuals approach the period in which they exhaust their eligibility
for unemployment benefits, they are willing to accept lower wage oﬀers. Hence without myopia there will be more
than two wage rates. In particular, if the duration is set to ?t periods there may potentially be ?t wage rates in
equilibrium, making the model intractable. In order to keep the model tractable with only two wage rates, but allow
for the flexibility with respect to the level of search-induced unemployment, we assume myopia. In the case of two
techonlogies this is a harmless assumption since there will be at most two wage rates under any duration length, even
without myopia
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This result can be verified by substituting into the wage determination equations (15) and (16).
Under this set-up the social planner has one additional degree of freedom in choosing optimal
unemployment compensation policy, namely, setting the duration of the first tier of the regime, t.
Let Ut denote the measure of unemployed agents during period t of unemployment compensation
(first-tier) eligibility. During the first t−1 periods of unemployment compensation eligibility agents
will only accept high-wage oﬀers. Maintaining our notation from previous sections, it follows that:
Ut = Ut−1(1− n) 2 ≤ t ≤ t
Denote by U the aggregate measure of unemployed agents whose reservation wage is high.
By construction:
U =
t−1X
t=1
Ut = U1
(1− (1− n)t−1)
n
(38)
Reformulating the unemployment compensation optimization focusing on the production
allocation problem (see equation (29)) yields:
max
x
=
,?x,U
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
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M
xZ
x
=
xdG(x)− V
?xZ
x
=
xdG(x)
G(bx)−G(x
=
)
− V
xZ
?x
xdG(x)
1−G(bx) + Uh
⎫
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⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(39)
subject to the same constraints as above, or re-formulated wherever relevant, reproduced here:
m(U, V )
V
V
= s(F − V ) (40)
m(U, V )
V
V
(U − U)
U
= s
£
F − F − V
¤
(41)
L− U = F − V − V (42)
27
F =M [1−G(x
=
)]] (43)
F =M [1−G(bx)]] (44)
U ≥ U1 (45)
U ≤ U1
n
(46)
U1 = s[L− U ] (47)
n =
m(U, V )VV
U
(48)
With (45) and (46) denoting constraints derived from (38) for the two limiting cases of t = 2
and t→∞.
Any change in duration policy, namely in t, translates into a change in U (by virtue of (38)).
To examine the implication of a change in duration policy, suppose that U is increased, fixing x
=
and bx. Fully diﬀerentiating equations (40)-(42) with respect to U yields:
0 <
dU
dU
< 1 (49)
It follows that the matching probability for a firm posting a vacancy oﬀering the high wage
rate, given by the term in brackets on the left-hand-side of (40), rises, whereas the corresponding
matching probability for a low wage vacancy, given by the term in brackets on the left-hand-side of
(41), declines. Thus the rise in U implies a higher aggregate level of unemployment (U) accompanied
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by enhanced sorting, that is a shift from low-wage vacancies towards high-wage vacancies, which
in equilibrium results in a shift from low-productivity firms towards high-productivity ones.
Balancing the two opposing forces will determine the optimum. To illustrate the point
consider the following figure derived for a numerical solution of the model based on the two-point
discrete example. The figure shows welfare as a function of duration, with the maximum of the
function determining optimal duration:20
50 100 150 200
t
620
640
660
680
700
720
W
9
Figure 4: Optimal Duration
The black dot (W=685 and t = 0) represents the welfare level attained by the no-sorting
configuration (where duration is set to zero, both technologies operate and matching is purely
20There is no particular importance to the numerical values here, but rather to the shape of the function. The
following parameter values are used: x = 14.3, x = 5.7, p = 0.5,M = 100, L = 70, s = 0.01, h = 0, α = 0.1 and
γ = 0.5.
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random across all firms). The upper dashed curve represents the welfare level (W=699) attained
by the high-sorting configuration, where all low productivity firms are crowded out of the market
and, again, duration is set to zero, so that workers are randomly assigned across all high productivity
firms. The solid curve represents the welfare level associated with the partial sorting configuration
(as a function of the duration of the first tier). The curve starts at t = 2 (minimal duration of
two periods). The solid curve is asymptotic to the lower dashed flat curve, which represents the
welfare level (W=624) associated with the limiting case where duration of the first tier is set at
infinity. As can be observed from the figure, the solid curve is initially rising (for t < 9) and then
monotonically falling (for t > 9). This reflects the tradeoﬀ between two opposing forces — matching
versus unemployment. For suﬃciently short durations, raising the duration yields matching gains
that outweigh the costs associated with the rise in unemployment (thus overall welfare is rising
with respect to t). For long enough duration the balance of forces reverse, hence, the welfare is
decreasing with respect to the length of duration. The optimum is obtained for the partial sorting
where duration is set at t = 9 This attains a higher welfare level than those associated with the
no-sorting and the high sorting configurations, respectively.21
A general pattern that emerges from the figure is that the optimal duration will always be
finite. That is, setting the duration to infinity (corresponding to the lower dashed flat curve in
the figure) will never be the optimal solution. As can be observed from the figure (and will be the
case under any parametric assumptions) implementing a partial sorting equilibrium and setting the
duration to infinity will always be dominated by the high-sorting configuration (the upper dashed
flat curve in the figure). The reason for this is simple. By setting the duration of the first tier of
high benefits to be extremely long, nearly all unassigned workers will reject any oﬀer received from
a low productivity firm. In such a case, the gain from having only a small number of individuals
21Note that when t∗ is set then the control variable U is set according to (38). Note, also, that the other controls
x
=
, ?x in (39) are set as a function of the properties of the productivity distribution. In the numerical example, as we
consider a two type discrete distribution, the two threshold levels are correspondingly set at the low productivity and
the high productivity levels.
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willing to accept job oﬀers from low productivity firms is outweighed by the cost associated with
the significant increase in voluntary unemployment, due to the massive job rejection. The economy
can do better by crowding out low-productivity firms altogether, i.e., implementing the high-sorting
configuration.
In appendix D we re-examine the relationship between the optimal duration and the prop-
erties of the productivity distribution (in the case of flexible duration). We demonstrate that our
key insights in section 3.2.2 carry over to the more general case. Notably, the optimal degree of
sorting (captured by the length of the duration of the first tier of benefits) is rising with respect to
the dispersion of the firm productivity distribution and decreasing with respect to its skewness
4 Consequences of Technological Change for Policy
There is evidence according to which recent changes in technology have generated increases in the
variance and skewness of the productivity distribution. Our analysis suggests that such changes
should engender a response of optimal unemployment compensation policy. In this brief section we
present the evidence and discuss the implications for policy.
Dunne, Foster, Haltiwanger, and Troske (2004) report that the between-plant measures of
wage and productivity dispersion have increased substantially over recent decades. They build on
the following logic proposed by Caselli (1999): technical change occurs through diﬀerential tech-
nology adoption by plants. If plants adopt new technologies at diﬀerent rates, and new technology
is skill- biased, this should lead to cross-plant changes in the dispersion of wages and productivity.
The authors measure productivity as the log of output per hour worked and use U.S. LRD plant
level data with 12,904 plants. The main findings are that a significant percentage of the observed
changes in the dispersion of wages and productivity is accounted for by changes in the distributions
of computer investment as well as changes in the wage and productivity diﬀerentials associated
with computer investment. More specifically, rising wage and productivity dispersion is accounted
for by rising wage and productivity diﬀerentials across plants with diﬀerent computer intensities.
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Productivity dispersion increased steadily after the early 1980s recession. It now also appears to be
the case that it is not only variance which had increased. Dew-Becker and Gordon (2005) report,
using U.S. data, a huge increase in the skewness of the income distribution. Between 1966 and
2001, skewness rose from 11 to 319 (in 2000 dollars, see their Table 9).
Our analysis caters for such changes. They represent a movement in a North Easterly
direction in the terms of Figures 2 and 3. Earlier we had noted that as we move in a South-
Easterly direction, either towards higher standard deviation and/or towards lower skewness, the
optimal degree of sorting rises. Optimal policy goes from no sorting to partial sorting to high sorting.
The empirical developments described here imply that the optimal policy response is ambiguous:
with higher variance of the productivity distribution, unemployment compensation policy needs to
generate greater sorting, while with higher skewness the opposite policy is required. This suggests
that policy will depend on the relative magnitudes of the changes in the moments of the distribution,
i.e., optimal policy will be a function of the relative increase in variance vs. increase in skewness.
If the former is dominant, sorting will need to increase; if the latter is dominant sorting will need
to decrease. Inspection of the above figures shows that as we move in the North Easterly direction
the region we are more likely to get into is the partial sorting zone, i.e., a declining benefit schedule
being the optimal policy. Except for the knife edge case of an exact oﬀset, there needs to be an
unemployment compensation policy response to skill-biased technological change. This lesson is
absent from policy discussions, both in the domain of skill-biased technological change and in the
domain of unemployment compensation policy.
5 Empirical Consistency
The model has examined optimal unemployment compensation policy from a normative perspective,
focusing on the response of policy to the productivity distribution. It has built on a number of
key elements: heterogeneity in firm productivity, a positive relationship between productivity and
wages, random matching, and a declining unemployment compensation time profile. How relevant
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empirically are these elements?
The assumption of firm heterogeneity is well supported by empirical studies. In U.S. data,
Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) using LRD establishment level data, Haltiwanger, Lane and
Spletzer (1999), and Haltiwanger, Lane and Spletzer (2007) using matched employer-employee data
of the Bureau of Census, find that: (i) firms locate along a productivity/earnings/skill locus with
some firms being high productivity, high wage, and high skill while others are low productivity,
low wage, and low skill; (ii) firm performance and behavior, even within quite narrowly defined
industries, is quite heterogeneous and this is a substantial and persistent phenomenon.
Abowd, Kramraz and Margolis (1999), using a longitudinal sample from France of over one
million workers from more than five hundred thousand firms, find that firms that hire high-wage
workers are more productive per worker. Mortensen (2003) argues that dispersion in wages paid for
observably equivalent workers is to be explained by diﬀerences in firm productivity and that more
productive firms oﬀer higher wages. He provides evidence from a matched employer-employee data
set for the Danish economy.
Though the current analysis has focused on a simple two-wage case, it is conducive to the
analysis of economies that are characterized by ‘polarization’ of the labor market. This term refers
to the phenomenon whereby employment polarizes into high-wage and low-wage jobs at the expense
of middle-wage work. Recent work by Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006) shows that this process is
manifest in U.S. data.
For empirical evidence on random matching see the survey by Petrongolo and Pissarides
(2001) and the structural estimates in Yashiv (2000).22Note too, that the current paper is fully con-
sistent with w including non pecuniary elements as well as wages, so workers may be compensated
not only by wage payments but also by other job attributes, such as job risk, work environment,
promotion chances, amenities etc. In this setting it seems reasonable to assume imperfections in
worker information about vacant jobs, and this is captured by the random matching assumption.
22For issues of ‘mismatch’ which underlie the analysis here see Manaconda and Petrongolo (1999).
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A declining unemployment compensation time profile is a very prevalent phenomenon. Un-
employment compensation duration is typically limited and is then replaced by social or income
assistance which is lower (and often means-tested, thereby leading to lower take up rates). Thus, for
example, data from OECD (2004) indicates that unemployment compensation duration in OECD
countries ranges between 6 and 60 months across 28 member countries, with only Belgium having
unlimited duration in some cases. In particular, 13 countries have a compensation duration of 12
months and less.
6 Relation to the Literature
We turn to discuss the place of the current paper in two literatures: the search literature and the
literature on optimal unemployment compensation policy. Starting with the former, the recent
survey by Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005) characterizes three main classes of search models:
random matching and bargaining (see Pissarides (2000)), directed search and wage posting (see
Moen (1997)), and random matching and wage posting (two key models and many references are
discussed in Section 6 of Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005)). The current paper belongs in the
last class. The first class, that includes bargaining, does not allow for the wage posting behavior
of firms, which is crucial for the eﬀects of unemployment compensation policy in the current set
up. Indeed that class of models is not geared to explain wage dispersion. The second class,
sometimes referred to as “competitive search theory,” does share a key feature with the current
approach: firms set wages optimally, knowing that the probability of filling a job rises with the
wage oﬀer. Additionally, as in Moen (2003), labor market segmentation arises due to the fact
that firms cannot condition wage oﬀers on the worker type and workers’ productivities diﬀer across
matches. But the segmentation in the current paper does not take the form of sub-markets and the
operation of market makers; rather, it is due to exogenous productivity dispersion and the eﬀects
of unemployment compensation policy.
The main line of research on the optimal design of unemployment compensation policy
34
has focused on issues of moral hazard and consumption smoothing (see Karni (1999) for a survey).
This literature examined the impact of work disincentives on the design of optimal schemes (the
seminal papers are by Baily (1978), Flemming (1978) and Shavell and Weiss (1979)). The main
insight provided by the early models was the desirability of a declining schedule, i.e. compensation
should decline over the spell of unemployment so as to mitigate the moral hazard eﬀect. The early
models have been recently extended in several directions, some of them into general equilibrium
frameworks. Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), as a notable example, enlarge the set of instruments
by allowing for a wage tax after re-employment. This model preserves the sequencing structure of
Shavel and Weiss (1979) and attains enhanced consumption smoothing.
The current paper does not belong in the above strand, as it does not consider issues of
risk aversion, consumption smoothing, moral hazard, or adverse selection. Rather it focuses on the
role unemployment compensation can play in attaining a better match between jobs and workers,
deriving optimal policy in the face of productivity dispersion. A seminal contribution in this
context has been made by Diamond (1981), who discussed the role of unemployment compensation
in enhancing eﬃciency in the context of a steady state search model. In his model unemployment
compensation makes job-taking use more stringent standards, thereby raising the vacancy rate and
improving the distribution of job oﬀers. Another paper in this spirit is Albrecht and Axell (1984).
The paper obtains a non-degenerate wage oﬀer distribution in a simple general equilibrium setup. It
demonstrates the role of unemployment benefits as a search subsidy that brings about re-allocation
of workers to more productive firms at the cost of increased unemployment. Our framework builds
on Albrecht and Axell (1984) but modifies their setup in a substantial way. Most importantly
we seek to make benefits a function of the properties of the productivity distribution. Thus we
relax the assumption of fixed arrival rates so firms can respond through wage posting and we allow
benefits to vary over time. These changes allow us to compare a declining time path (of diﬀerent
duration lengths) to a flat scheme, as a function of the variance and skewness of the productivity
distribution.
There are a number of more recent contributions that have dealt with related issues and
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it is worthwhile delineating their relation to the current paper: in Marimon and Zilibotti (1999)
unemployment compensation improves matching between ex-ante heterogenous workers and ex-ante
heterogenous firms under random matching. Unemployment compensation serves to reduce worker-
job mismatch, as without unemployment compensation workers would tend to accept unsuitable
jobs. This paper however does not deal with optimal unemployment compensation policy, as
does the current one, and does not make any connection between unemployment compensation
policy and heterogeneous firm productivity. The model of Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) shares
with the current paper the idea that unemployment compensation generates an increase in output,
whereby more productive firms choose to oﬀer higher wages and more workers are assigned to
those firms. However Aceomglu and Shimer have risk aversion at the heart of their analysis and
unemployment compensation has an insurance role. By oﬀering unemployment compensation, apart
from the consumption smoothing argument, the policymaker induces risk-averse workers to take
on a higher degree of unemployment risk, boosting investment by firms. Their set-up is one with
directed search, so externality issues do not arise. In the model here a key point is unemployment
compensation policy turning random matching into assortative matching against the backdrop of
heterogeneity in productivity. Thus the mechanism studied is entirely diﬀerent; it does not relate to
risk aversion (agents are risk-neutral) but rather explores the role of unemployment compensation
policy in aﬀecting firm and worker behavior to obtain enhanced matching. Finally, Albrecht and
Vroman (2005) present a model of wage posting, matching, declining unemployment compensation,
and a two-tier wage system in equilibrium, as is the case here. They show how time-varying
unemployment compensation can generate wage dispersion even though firms and workers are
homogenous . However, their paper does not contain two key ingredients of the current paper: firm
productivity dispersion (in their model firms are identical) and a normative analysis of optimal
policy.
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7 Conclusions
This paper has studied optimal unemployment compensation policy from a macroeconomic per-
spective. A key insight is that the degree of productivity heterogeneity (in terms of skewness and
variance) matters for the design of the time path of unemployment compensation. Workers react
to unemployment compensation policy through job acceptance decisions; firms react to unemploy-
ment compensation policy through wage posting, with the associated market segmentation. In a
world of random matching, output gains are induced by a declining unemployment compensation
profile that induces worker sorting. The longer the duration of the first phase, the higher the degree
of induced heterogeneity and sorting. The main elements of the model — productivity dispersion,
positive association of productivity and wages, random matching, and a declining unemployment
compensation profile — were shown to be empirically relevant. Thus, while the model is essentially
normative, it is consistent with known empirical regularities. Note that although we have not al-
lowed for capital investment and endogenous formation of heterogeneous firms, the distribution of
posted jobs is endogenously determined, as some low productivity jobs are crowded out, and the
distribution of filled vacancies is endogenously determined, as high productivity firms face a lower
vacancy risk. Allowing for capital investment would maintain the sorting-unemployment tradeoﬀ
but would complicate the analysis.
A key lesson is that even in the absence of moral hazard arguments there is a role for
a declining time profile of unemployment compensation. By enhancing matching it operates to
increase output and eﬃciency (in a constrained setting). Particularly important is the dependence
of optimal policy on the properties of the productivity distribution. This kind of connection has
received little, if any, attention thus far. In future work we hope to provide a mapping from
empirically-relevant dispersion of firms’ productivities to a larger set of policy instruments.
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8 Appendix A
Derivation of the Wage Equations
We reproduce the relevant equations for convenience:
H1 = z + h+ β[nmax(J,H2) + nmax(J,H2) + (1− n− n)H2] (50)
H2 = z + h+ β[nmax(J,H) + nmax(J,H) + (1− n− n)H] (51)
H = a+ h+ β[nmax(J,H) + nmax(J,H) + (1− n− n)H] (52)
J = w + β[(1− s)J + sH1] (53)
J = w + β[(1− s)J + sH1] (54)
J = H2 (55)
J = H (56)
Subtracting (54) from (53) yields:
J − J = w − w
1− β(1− s) (57)
Subtracting (52) from (51) yields:
i
H2 −H = z − a (58)
Substituting (55) and (56) into (57), and then substituting (57) into (58) yields:
z − a = w − w
1− β(1− s)
This is equation (15) in the main text.
Substituting (55) into (50) and noting that J = H2 > J yields:
H1 = z + h+ βH2 (59)
Substituting (55) into (53) yields:
[1− β(1− s)]H2 = w + βsH1 (60)
Solving (59) and (60) for H2 and simplifying yields:
[1− β(1− s)− β2s]H2 = w + βs(z + h) (61)
Substituting (55) and (56) into (51) and re-formulating yields:
(1− β)H2 = z + h− β(1− n)[H2 −H] (62)
Substituting (58) into (62), then substituting from (61) into (62) for H2 and simplifying,
yields:
w = (z − a)[(1− β) + βn− β2s(1− n)] + h+ a
This is equation (16) in the main text.
ii
9 Appendix B
Proof of Proposition in Section 3
Proof. First observe that by virtue of linearity with respect to 4 for each one of the schedules
(35)-(36), each configuration will appear at most once on the welfare frontier (single crossing prop-
erty).
Next, note that the finiteness of set of configurations ensures non-emptiness.
Note further that for 4 = 0, the no-sorting configuration is welfare maximizing, since μ > h and
NNS > max[NPS ,NHS ]. Then, by continuity, for suﬃciently small 4, the no-sorting configuration
is socially desirable.
Let NS denote the set of all 4, for which the no-sorting configuration is welfare maximizing. The
set NS is non-empty (as just shown) and bounded from above (by construction of the spread 4).
Thus, it has a least upper bound. We denote it by 41.
Next, note that if the high-sorting configuration is welfare maximizing for some 40, then it remains
the maximizing configuration for all 40 ≤ 4. To see that, suppose, by way of contradiction, that
the opposite holds true. Since the schedule of the no-sorting configuration is flat, whereas the high-
sorting configuration is rising with respect to 4, the only case we need to examine is the possibility
where partial-sorting attains a higher level of welfare than high sorting for some 4, 4 ≥ 40 This
necessarily implies that the slope of the partial sorting schedule with respect to 4 is steeper than
the corresponding slope of the high sorting schedule. Formally:
NPS
q − p
1− p > N
HS
which implies
NPS > NHS
Thus, we obtain a contradiction, since it follows that for all 4, partial sorting is preferred
iii
to high sorting.
Let HS denote the set of all 4 for which the high-sorting configuration is welfare maximizing. The
set is bounded from below (by construction of the spread 4). If it is non-empty, it has a highest
lower bound. Let 42 denote the highest lower bound (if it exists) and set 42 = 1−pp(μ−h) , otherwise.
This completes the proof.
10 Appendix C
Implementation of the Partial Sorting Equilibrium
We set F =M and F = pM .
We substitute (17) and (18) in (19) and (20) correspondingly, and solve the system (19)-(23)
for five unknowns: V , V , U1, U2, and U.
To insure existence of partial-sorting equilibrium, we need to verify that our solution satisfies
(15), (16) and (25). Modified to the discrete case, eq. (25) turns into two inequality conditions:
m(U, V )
V
(U − U1)
U
(x− w) ≥ m(U, V )
V
(x− w) (63)
m(U, V )
V
(x− w) ≥ m(U, V )
V
(U − U1)
U
(x− w) (64)
This is easy to observe for we have two instruments at our disposal — a and z. Using (15)
we fix some ε > 0 arbitrarily small, and set z − a small enough such that w − w = ε . Using
(16), we adjust a, such that w = x + ε2 . For ε > 0 suﬃciently small, (25) is satisfied i.e. all
high-productivity firms choose to oﬀer w, whereas all low-productivity firms choose to oﬀer w.
11 Appendix D
Duration Policy Simulation
iv
We provide further analysis of the duration simulation in terms of the moments of the
productivity distribution. We re-do the analysis of section 3.2.2, setting the duration at one period
longer than in the benchmark model, i.e., using t = 3 as opposed to t = 2. Crucially note, that
as we focus on the two-point distribution, there would be at most two wage rates in equilibrium
regardless of the duration. We allow for an additional equilibrium configuration, to be denoted
P2S, which we shall refer to as enhanced partial sorting. Note that it is diﬀerent from the partial
sorting configuration, PS, discussed above, where duration was set at t = 2. Figure D-1 depicts
seven diﬀerent curves in the skewness - standard deviation space. Three new curves, labeled
N − P2, P − P2, P2 −H, are added to the four curves that appear in Figure 2 above. We maintain
the notation used above. Thus, for instance, along the P − P2 curve the partial sorting and the
enhanced partial sorting attain the same level of welfare. The figure is based on a numerical
solution, using the same parametric assumptions used to derive Figure 2.
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Figure D-1: Skewness and Variance Relationships
We provide again an illustrative figure on a magnified scale (Figure D-2). The solid parts
divide the space into four disjoint regions. For any point which lies in the region labeled NS,
the no-sorting configuration attains the highest level of welfare and is therefore socially desirable.
Similarly, for points that lie in the regions labeled, respectively, PS, P2S and HS, the partial
sorting, enhanced partial sorting, and high-sorting configurations prevail, correspondingly.
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Figure D-2: Optimal Unemployment Compensation Regions
Several insights emerge from inspection of the figure:
First, compare Figure D-2 to Figure 3. It can be seen that allowing for the setting of an
extended duration of the first tier of the unemployment compensation scheme expands the range
in which a declining unemployment compensation time path prevails, i.e., either partial sorting
(PS) or enhanced partial sorting (P2S). Notably, the added flexibility of setting the duration of
the first tier implies that the enhanced partial sorting configuration crowds out both the partial
sorting configuration and the high-sorting one, as the social planner can now achieve better balance
between the opposing matching and employment considerations. In other words, there is some “fine
tuning” of the high sorting and the partial sorting configurations.
vii
Second, one can see that the optimal degree of sorting, which is determined by the length of
the duration of the first tier, is rising with respect to the dispersion (s.d.) of the firm technological
distribution, and is decreasing with respect to the skewness. Thus, as we move either rightwards,
increasing the s.d, or downwards, reducing skewness, we gradually increase the optimal degree of
sorting by extending the duration. This reflects the fundamental trade-oﬀ between matching and
employment considerations.
While the figure demonstrates only three diﬀerent durations (t = 0, 2, 3),23noting that the
no-sorting configuration is essentially the limiting case, whereby the duration is set to zero (t = 0),
it is straightforward to see how the analysis can be extended to any range of durations. The more
flexibility we add, the more refined will be the partition of the variance-skewness space. Thus, for
example, allowing for a fifth configuration, where the duration would be set at t = 4, we would
obtain another intersection point along the P2 −H curve to the right of TP3, which would yield
a fork-shaped region stemming from the intersection point. In this region the new configuration
would prevail, crowding out the high-sorting and the enhanced partial sorting configurations. As
we refine duration policy, we would obtain additional fork-shaped regions like those stemming from
intersection points TP1 and TP3.
23The fourth equilibrium configuration depicted in the figure is the high-sorting one, for which duration policy is
irrelevant, as we crowd out all low-productivity firms and hence can gain nothing from ‘voluntary’ unemployment.
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